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The paper provides a new proof of the positivity of the optimal
marginal income tax, in a more general model, under weaker assump-
tions. The analysis focusses on the (weakly) relaxed problem in which
upward incentive constraints are replaced by a monotonicity condition
on consumption. Without upward incentive constraints, nonnegativity
of the optimal marginal income tax is straightforward; strict positivity
follows from an assumption on the desirability of redistributing leisure.
The resulting allocation is incentive compatible, and is optimal for the
original income tax problem. The argument is the same for distribu-
tions with ﬁnitely many types and for a continuous type distribution.
Key Words: Optimal Income Taxation, Utilitarian Welfare Maxi-
mization, Redistribution
JEL Classiﬁcaton: D63, H21
1 Introduction
The central result of the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation states
that, under asymmetric information, when individual productivity (earning
ability) is a hidden characteristic, the optimal marginal income tax is strictly
positive at all income levels other than the very top and, in some speciﬁca-
tions, the very bottom of the income distribution. The ﬁrst version of this
∗I am very grateful to Felix Bierbrauer, Christoph Engel, Thomas Gaube, and Peter
Norman for very helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1result was proved by Mirrlees (1971, 1976) for a model with a continuum of
types; his result has subsequently been generalized by Seade (1977, 1982),
Ebert (1992), and Brunner (1993, 1995). For models with ﬁnitely many
types, diﬀerent versions of the result have been provided by Guesnerie and
Seade (1982), Stiglitz (1982), Roëll (1985), and Weymark (1986).
In this paper, I develop a new approach to proving this result. The
new approach provides for a sharper formulation of the theorem, in a more
general model, under weaker assumptions. More importantly, it provides for
a transparent account of the underlying logic, relating the mathematics to
the economics and making clear where exactly and how the key assumptions
enter the analysis. In contrast to the literature, the overall proof strategy is
the same for models with ﬁnitely many types and with a continuum of types.
Moreover, for models with a continuum of types, there is no need to have
diﬀerent arguments for diﬀerent cases. In contrast, Seade’s (1982) analysis,
on which most subsequent work has built,1 involves separate treatments
depending on whether consumption and leisure are (Edgeworth) substitutes
or complements; this makes it hard to see the common underlying structure.
The new approach proceeds indirectly. Following Matthews and Moore
(1987), I study a modiﬁcation of the optimal income tax problem, which
is obtained if upward incentive constraints are replaced by a monotonicity
condition on consumption. Under suitable assumptions, I show that the
modiﬁed problem is equivalent to the optimal income tax problem in the
sense that, up to modiﬁcations on a null set, any solution to one problem is
also a solution to the other and vice versa.
In the modiﬁed problem, it is straightforward to show that optimal mar-
ginal income taxes are never negative. Negative marginal income taxes, i.e.,
a subsidization of work at the margin, would induce people to work and
to consume more than is eﬃcient.2 Such a distortion could only be justi-
ﬁed by upward incentive constraints requiring workloads to be ﬁxed with a
1E.g., Ebert (1992), Brunner (1993, 1995).
2This argument assumes that, as in Mirrlees (1971), consumption-leisure choices are
made at the intensive margin. Saez (2002) has shown that negative marginal income taxes
can be optimal if consumption-leisure choices are made at the extensive margin, so people
of type n choose only whether to work at a job of type n or not to work; see also Laroque
(2005). In this case, there is no question of a person of type n choosing to work at a
job of type n-1 and earning a lower income; marginal income taxes as such are therefore
economically unimportant. The optimal tax on income earned on a job of type n is
obtained from a simple elasticities consideration involving only people of type n. A model
involving choices at both the intensive and the extensive margins would have to allow for
multidimensional type heterogeneity; the proper treatment of incentive compatibility in
such a model is as yet an open issue.
2view to preventing people with lower earning abilities from imitating people
with higher earning abilities. When upward incentive constraints are not
imposed, such considerations cannot play a role.
The fact that one does not have to worry about negative marginal taxes
makes it easier to see under what conditions it is desirable to have strictly
positive marginal taxes. This makes it possible to widen the scope, sharpen
the conclusions, and weaken the key assumption of the main theorem.
Since Mirrlees (1971), papers on optimal income taxation with a contin-
uum of types have usually assumed that the unknown productivity parame-
ter corresponds to the wage rate that a person earns. In contrast, for models
with a ﬁnite number of types, Guesnerie and Seade (1982) have introduced a
more abstract formulation in which the productivity parameter is simply an
argument of the utility function which aﬀects attitudes towards consumption
and output provision. The present paper uses the abstract formulation of
Guesnerie and Seade (1982) for models with a continuum, as well as a ﬁnite
number of types. The greater abstractness of the formulation necessitates a
more abstract formulation of the underlying assumptions. This contributes
to clarifying their respective roles.
The key assumption providing the rationale for utilitarian redistribution
is formulated in local terms. Moreover, this assumption is formulated in
terms of redistributing leisure rather than consumption. I postulate that, in
the absence of incentive considerations, certain allocations cannot be welfare
maximizing because, at any one of these allocations, utilitarian welfare can
be increased by redistributing leisure from people with a given productivity
level to people with slightly higher productivity levels, allowing the former
to work less and requiring the latter to work more so that total output is
unchanged. This postulate is imposed for all allocations with consumption-
leisure choices that are eﬃcient for people with the lower productivity level
and either eﬃcient or distorted in the direction of too little consumption
and too much leisure for people with the higher productivity levels.
Under this assumption, I show that, if the type set is ﬁnite, the optimal
marginal income tax is strictly positive for all types below the top. If the
type set is an interval and the distribution of types has a continuous and
strictly positive density on this interval, the optimal marginal income tax is
strictly positive and bounded away from zero on any compact set of types
between the bottom and the top of the distribution. In contrast to past
treatments, this result does not leave open the possibility that the optimal
marginal income tax might be zero at or arbitrarily close to zero near some
3isolated point.3
These results can be understood in terms of a local equity-eﬃciency
tradeoﬀ. If the marginal tax rate that is relevant for a given type is zero, then
this type’s consumption-leisure choice is eﬃcient. Given the information
that marginal tax rates are never negative, any higher type’s consumption-
leisure choice is either eﬃcient or distorted in the direction of too little
consumption and too much leisure. The assumption on the desirability of
redistribution therefore implies that, if the relevant marginal tax rate for
any type is zero, then it is desirable to redistribute output requirements
from people with this type to people with slightly higher types. Ceteris
paribus, such a redistribution may violate downward incentive compatibility.
However, the incentive eﬀects can be neutralized by distorting the lower
type’s consumption-leisure choice in the direction of too little consumption
and too much leisure. The question then is whether the eﬃciency loss of
this shift away from an eﬃcient consumption-leisure pair is outweighed by
the postulated gain from the redistribution. By standard arguments, this is
always the case because, for a small shift away from eﬃciency, the eﬃciency
loss is negligible.4
In formulating the key assumption on the desirability of redistribution
exclusively in terms of leisure, I depart from the traditional utilitarian no-
tion that it is desirable to redistribute consumption because people with
higher consumption have a lower marginal utility of consumption. In the
theory of income taxation, this notion goes back (at least) to Edgeworth
(1897/1925).5 Mirrlees (1971, 1976), as well as Guesnerie and Seade (1982)
and Weymark (1986), have followed this tradition. They recognized that
diﬀerences in consumption levels which are due to diﬀerences in the hid-
3Thus, Seade (1982) proceeds by assuming that positivity fails on some interval and
obtains a contradiction by comparing the consumption-income pairs that are associated
with the two endpoints of the interval. This argument neglects the possibility that the
interval in question might be degenerate, i.e., consist of a single point, in which case the
comparison in question is moot.
4The argument presumes that the two sets of people that are involved are of commen-
surate sizes. This presumption holds for the speciﬁcations studied in this paper. However,
it does not hold if the two sets of people that are involved are not of commensurate sizes,
in particular, if the lower type has positive mass and any nearby higher type has zero
mass. In this case, the aggregate potential gains from redistributing output requirements
between people with these types are zero and do not outweigh the eﬃciency loss from
reducing consumption and increasing leisure for the mass of people with the lower type.
Thus, in Hellwig (2005 b), I show that, for a type distribution involving mass points, as
well as an interval support, the optimal marginal tax for a type with positive mass is zero
unless there is bunching.
5For a comprehensive account, see Chapter 5 of Musgrave (1959).
4den productivity parameters are likely to be correlated with diﬀerences in
leisure, but, through additional assumptions, they avoided the complications
that this might cause. Thus, in Mirrlees (1971), additive separability of util-
ity functions eliminates the possibility that people with higher consumption
may be hungrier, even at the margin, because these people also work more.
The focus on the desirability of redistributing consumption was loos-
ened by Seade (1982) and Roëll (1985). For the model of Mirrlees (1971),
Seade (1982) showed that the assumption of additive separability of the
utility function can be replaced by the assumption that leisure is a non-
inferior good. For the more abstract utility speciﬁcation of Guesnerie and
Seade (1982), Roëll (1985) showed that the traditional redistribution as-
sumption in terms of consumption can be weakened to the assumption that
it is desirable to redistribute consumption or leisure from high-productivity
to low-productivity participants.6 She also showed that, for the utility spec-
iﬁcation of Mirrlees (1971), this condition is implied by noninferiority of
leisure.7
This paper goes one step further and eliminates any reference to the de-
sirability of redistributing consumption. At ﬁrst sight, this may seem more
restrictive than Roëll’s formulation: Where she postulates the desirability of
redistributing consumption or leisure, I postulate the desirability of redis-
tributing leisure. However, I impose this condition on a smaller set of initial
allocations. For the initial allocations on which I impose it, the desirability
of redistributing consumption necessarily also implies the desirability of re-
distributing leisure, i.e., the alternative that Roëll allows for is moot. For
the utility speciﬁcation of Mirrlees (1971), with types corresponding to wage
rates, the redistribution assumption which I use is actually weaker than all
the assumptions that have been used previously. The weakening is possible
because the indirect approach to the optimal income tax problem eliminates
many allocations from consideration before one ever gets to questions of
redistribution.
For the model with a continuum of types, the paper also provides a tech-
nical generalization. Relying on a reformulation of Pontryagin’s maximum
principle for problems with monotonicity constraints on controls, I can do
without requirements such as continuity or piecewise continuous diﬀerentia-
bility of optimal allocations and optimal tax schedules, which have hitherto
been imposed. Given that optimal allocations and optimal tax schedules are
6In the formal statement of her theorem, Roëll only claims nonnegativity of the optimal
marginal income tax. However, the arguments given by Guesnerie and Seade (1982) for
strict positivity apply to her speciﬁcation as well.
7On this point, see also Brunner (1993, 1995) and Homburg (2004).
5endogenous, the imposition of such conditions by ﬁat is problematic.
In the following, Section 2.1 formulates the optimal and relaxed income
tax problems. Section 2.2 states the assumptions which I impose and re-
lates them to the assumptions imposed in the literature. Section 3 states
and explains the main results. Section 4 provides a proof for the case of
ﬁnitely many types, Section 5 for the case when the type set is an interval
and the type distribution has a continuous, strictly positive density. Some
supplementary proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Optimal Income Tax Problem
2.1 The Problem
Following Mirrlees (1971, 1976) and Seade (1977, 1982), I study a large
economy with one produced good and labour. Each agent in the economy
is characterized by a productivity parameter n. An agent with productivity
parameter n who consumes c units of the produced good and who supplies
the labour needed to produce y units of output obtains the payoﬀ u(c,y,n).





In this speciﬁcation, n is labour productivity (the wage rate) and
y
n is the
number of hours the person needs to work to produce the output y or to
obtain the labour income y. The analysis here encompasses (2.1), but is not
limited to this speciﬁcation.
The productivity parameter n of any one person is the realization of
a nondegenerate random variable ˜ n with probability distribution F with
compact support N ⊂ ℜ+. The distribution F is the same for all agents. By
a large-numbers eﬀect, F is also assumed to be the cross-section distribution
of the realizations of people’s productivity parameters.
In this economy, an allocation is a pair of functions, (c( ),y( )), which
indicate how an individual’s consumption level c(n) and output provision







so aggregate consumption does not exceed aggregate production. The allo-
cation is incentive compatible if
u(c(n′),y(n′),n′) ≥ u(c(n),y(n),n′) (2.3)
6for all n and n′ in N, so nobody has an incentive to claim that his pro-
ductivity parameter is n when in fact it is n′. An individual’s productivity
parameter and labour input are taken to be private information, so incentive
compatibility is a prerequisite for the implementation of an allocation.




where, for each n,
v(n) = u(c(n),y(n),n) (2.5)
is the utility that a person with productivity parameter n obtains from the
allocation. The utilitarian welfare maximization problem is to maximize
(2.4) over the set of feasible and incentive compatible allocations. By the
taxation principle of Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995), this problem is
equivalent to the problem of choosing an optimal tax schedule T( ) and then
letting each person choose an output provision level y and a consumption
level c = y−T(y). Therefore, I refer to it as the optimal income tax problem.
As discussed in the introduction, I will not study the optimal income tax
problem directly. Following a line of argument that was ﬁrst developed by
Matthews and Moore (1987) for a monopoly problem, I will instead study
the modiﬁed problem which is obtained if the requirement of incentive com-
patibility is weakened to downward incentive compatibility and, in addition,
a weak monotonicity requirement is imposed on consumption. I refer to
this modiﬁed problem as the weakly relaxed income tax problem. The word
"weakly" highlights the fact that I do not just drop the upward incentive
constraints, but that I replace them with a monotonicity constraint on con-
sumption.8
In the weakly relaxed income tax problem, an allocation (c( ),y( )) is
chosen to maximize (2.4) subject to the feasibility constraint (2.2) and the
requirement that
u(c(n′),y(n′),n′) ≥ u(c(n),y(n),n′) (2.6)
and
c(n′) ≥ c(n) (2.7)
8In contrast, Matthews and Moore (1987) study a relaxed problem involving only down-
ward incentive constraints. In their general discussion of how to simplify global incentive
constraints, they mention the possibility of using monotonicity in combination with adja-
cent downward incentive compatibility; see in particular fn. 15, p. 447. Their discussion
is taken up again by Besley and Coate (1995, p. 197).
7for all n and all n′ ≥ n in N. I will show that, under standard assump-
tions, this problem is actually equivalent to the optimal income tax problem,
namely that both problems have the same solutions. This is useful because,
in the weakly relaxed income tax problem, the implications of redistribu-
tion concerns and incentive constraints are easier to disentangle than in the
optimal income tax problem itself.
I restrict the analysis to canonical solutions. A solution (c( ),y( )) to
the weakly relaxed or the optimal income tax problem is called canonical if
it is continuous at any endpoint of N to which the distribution F assigns
zero mass. By focussing on canonical solutions, I avoid having to account
for the trivial multiplicity of equivalent solutions which arises because mod-
iﬁcations of an allocation on null sets have no eﬀects on the value of the
welfare functional (2.4) or the validity of the feasibility constraint (2.2) and,
moreover, at the endpoints n0 = minN and n1 = maxN, such modiﬁca-
tions are possible without upsetting downward incentive compatibility or
incentive compatibility.
The restriction to canonical allocation involves no signiﬁcant loss of gen-
erality. Indeed, if N is ﬁnite, it involves no loss of generality at all. If N
is an interval, then, for any non-canonical solution of the weakly relaxed or
the optimal income tax problem, there an equivalent canonical solution can
always be obtained by replacing (c(n),y(n)) at any endpoint that has zero
mass with the corresponding limit of (c(n′),y(n′)) as n′ converges to the
endpoint in question.
Remark 2.1 If (c( ),y( )) is a solution to the weakly relaxed or the opti-
mal income tax problem, an equivalent canonical solution (¯ c( ), ¯ y( )) is ob-
tained by setting (¯ c(n0), ¯ y(n0)) = limn↓n0(c(n),y(n)) if F({n0}) = 0 and
(¯ c(n1), ¯ y(n1)) = limn↑n1(c(n),y(n)) if F({n1}) = 0, leaving everything else
unchanged.
I shall be interested in the eﬃciency properties of the canonical solutions
to the weakly relaxed and the optimal income tax problem. For any n ∈ N,
the consumption/output pair (c(n),y(n)) is said to be eﬃcient for n if
(c(n),y(n)) = (c∗(n,v(n)),y∗(n,v(n))), (2.8)
where, for any v, (c∗(n,v),y∗(n,v)) is the pair which provides the person
with productivity parameter n with the utility v at the lowest cost in terms
of required net resources c− y, i.e., (c∗(n,v),y∗(n,v)) solves the problem
min
u(c,y,n)≥v
(c − y); (2.9)
8the pair (c(n),y(n)) is said to be distorted downward from eﬃciency if
(c(n),y(n)) << (c∗(n,v(n)),y∗(n,v(n))) (2.10)
and to be distorted upward from eﬃciency if
(c(n),y(n)) >> (c∗(n,v(n)),y∗(n,v(n))). (2.11)
2.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions are imposed throughout the paper.
RMQ Regularity, Monotonicity, and Quasiconcavity: The utility func-
tion u : ℜ3
+ → ℜ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, as well as increas-
ing in c, decreasing in y, nondecreasing in n, and strictly quasiconcave
in c and y.
PEP Positivity of Eﬃcient Production: For all n ∈ N and all v in the
range of u( , ,n), there exists a unique pair (c∗(n,v),y∗(n,v)) that
solves problem (2.9); moreover, y∗(n,v) > 0.








for all (c,y,n) ∈ ℜ2
++ × (0,1).
DR Desirability of Redistribution: For any (c,y,n) ∈ ℜ2
+ × [n0,n1),
there exists ε > 0 such that n + ε ∈ N, and, for all n′ ∈ (n,n + ε]
and all (c′,y′) ∈ ℜ2
+ satisfying c′ ≥ c and u(c′,y′,n′) ≥ u(c,y,n′), the
inequality ￿ ￿uy(c′,y′,n′)
￿ ￿ < |uy(c,y,n)| (2.13)
holds (a) if c′ = c and y′ ≤ y, and (b) if (c,y) is eﬃcient for n, and
(c′,y′) is eﬃcient or distorted downwards from eﬃciency for n′.
Assumptions RMQ, PEP, and SSCC are standard. In RMQ, I postulate
quasiconcavity rather than concavity of u. As indicated by Proposition 2.2
below, concavity can play a role in the desirability of redistribution, but
then, it belongs in the context of DR. PEP means that, for every n and and
every attainable utility level v, the eﬃcient pair (c∗(n,v),y∗(n,v)) is well
9deﬁned and unique; moreover, the eﬃcient output level y∗(n,v) is strictly
positive. SSCC reﬂects the notion that the tradeoﬀ between consumption
and leisure results in a higher level of consumption and a lower level of
leisure (more output provision) when the productivity parameter is higher.
As discussed, e.g., in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), under RMQ, SSCC
implies that, for all (c,y),(c′,y′) in ℜ2
+ and all n,n′ in ℜ+, the inequalities
u(c,y,n) ≥ u(c′,y′,n), y > y′, and n > n′ imply u(c,y,n) > u(c′,y′,n).9
Condition DR provides the rationale for utilitarian redistribution. If
an allocation (c( ),y( )) satisﬁes the inequality (2.13) for some n and n′ in
N, then, at this allocation, people with productivity parameter n′ have a
lower marginal disutility of providing additional output than people with
productivity parameter n. The sum of these people’s utilities is therefore
increased if output requirements are redistributed from people with pro-
ductivity parameter n to people with productivity parameter n′. If there
are no incentive considerations standing in the way, the utilitarian welfare
maximizer would like to redistribute output requirements so as to allow the
people with productivity parameter n to enjoy more and the people with
productivity parameter n′ to enjoy less leisure.
Condition DR postulates this desirability of redistributing output re-
quirements for two types of allocations. Part (a) postulates it for allocations
satisfying c(n′) = c(n) and y(n′) ≤ y(n) where n′ > n is close to n. In combi-
nation with downward incentive compatibility, this postulate will be used to
show that, at a solution to the weakly relaxed income tax problem, people
with the same consumption must also produce the same output. For the
utility speciﬁcation (2.1) with concave U, this property holds automatically
because people with type n′ have to work fewer hours to provide any given
output than people with type n < n′.
Part (b) of DR postulates the desirability of redistributing output re-
quirements for allocations where (c(n),y(n)) is eﬃcient for n, (c(n′),y(n′))
is eﬃcient or distorted downward from eﬃciency for n′, and n′ > n is close
to n. This postulate will be used to show that, at any solution to the weakly
relaxed income tax problem, unless n = n0 and F({n0}) = 0, the pair
9If N is a ﬁnite set, the strictness of the inequality in (2.12) is only needed near the
top; below the second-highest type, it is enough to have a weak inequality in (2.12). If N
is an interval, this weakening is not possible; equality in (2.12) might imply that types in
some subinterval are observationally indistinguishable. The model then is equivalent to
one where the distribution of types has a mass point, and the result in Hellwig (2005 b)
implies that, unless there is additional bunching, a zero marginal tax is optimal.
10Figure 1: The set of outcome pairs (c′,y′) for n′ to which part (b) of DR
applies.
(c(n),y(n)) cannot be eﬃcient.
The condition is illustrated in Figure 1. In this ﬁgure, (c∗(n),y∗(n)) is
an eﬃcient outcome pair for type n, I(n′) is the indiﬀerence curve of type
n′ > n through (c∗(n),y∗(n)), and A − A is the locus of eﬃcient outcome
pairs for type n′. Part (b) of DR postulates that, if n′ > n is suﬃcently
close to n, then (2.13) hold for all outcome pairs (c(n′),y(n′)) in the shaded
area to the left of the locus A−A of eﬃcient outcome pairs for type n′ and
on or above the indiﬀerence curve I(n′) and the horizontal line through the
reference pair (c∗(n),y∗(n)).
To appreciate the relation of condition DR to the literature, it is useful
to consider the following alternative condition:
GMSC Generalized Mirrlees-Seade Condition: (a) For all (c,y,n) ∈
ℜ3
+, uyy(c,y,n) ≤ 0 and uyn(c,y,n) > 0, and (b) for any two triples
(c,y,n) and (c′,y′,n′) such that n′ > n, c′ ≥ c, and u(c′,y′,n′) ≥
u(c,y,n′), one has
uc(c′,y′,n′) < uc(c,y,n) or
￿ ￿uy(c′,y′,n′)
￿ ￿ < |uy(c,y,n)|. (2.14)
For concave u, part (a) of GMSC is the same as part (a) of DR. For
utility functions taking the special form (2.1), this condition is automatically
satisﬁed if u is concave.10 Part (b) of GMSC corresponds to the ”very weak
10For arbitrary utility speciﬁcations, this is not true. For such speciﬁcations, GMSC
is therefore stronger than Roëll’s imposition of concavity and part (b) of GMSC. The
11redistribution assumption” that Roëll (1985) gave for the ﬁnite-type model
of Guesnerie and Seade (1982). This condition diﬀers from part (b) of DR in
two respects. First, in GMSC, the condition is formulated in global rather
than local terms, referring to all n′ > n, rather than all n′ > n that are
suﬃciently close to n. Second, part (b) of GMSC asserts the desirability
of redistributing required output or consumption. If the premises of this
condition are satisﬁed, then either the marginal utility of consumption or the
marginal disutility of working to provide additional output is lower for the
person with productivity parameter n′ than for the person with productivity
parameter n; the utilitarian welfare maximizer then desires a redistribution
of leisure or of consumption from the former to the latter. In contrast,
part (b) of DR asserts the desirability of redistributing output requirements.
Moreover, this condition compares uy(c,y,n) and uy(c′,y′,n′) only for types
and outcome pairs such that n and n′ are close to each other, (c,y) eﬃcient
for type n and (c′,y′) not distorted upwards from eﬃciency for type n′.
Because (2.14) allows for an alternative and (2.13) does not, one may be
tempted to consider GMSC to be the weaker condition. In fact, the opposite
is true. If the additional premises of part (b) of DR are satisﬁed, i.e., if (c,y)
is eﬃcient for n and (c′,y′) is eﬃcient or distorted downwards from eﬃciency
for n′, one has uc(c,y,n) ≤ |uy(c,y,n)| and uc(c′,y′,n′) ≥ |uy(c′,y′,n′)|, so
(2.14) actually implies (2.13). Thus GMSC implies DR.
What does condition DR mean for the utility function u? For utility
functions taking the special form (2.1), GMSC is implied by strict concavity
of u in combination with Seade’s (1982) assumption that leisure is a noninfe-
rior good.11 Trivially therefore, for such utility functions, DR is also implied
by strict concavity of u and noninferiority of leisure. The following result
gives a more general condition for u to satisfy DR. This condition does not
presume that u takes the special form (2.1).
Proposition 2.2 Assume RMQ, PEP, and SSCC, and suppose that, for
any n, the indiﬀerence curves of the utility function u( , ,n) have strictly
positive Gaussian curvature.12 Assume also that N is an interval. Then
condition DR holds if u is concave in c and y and, moreover,
uyn(c,y,n) > 0 (2.15)
additional assumption is needed to eliminate the possibility that the weakly relaxed income
tax problem has a solution with c(n) = c(n
′) and y(n) > y(n
′) for some n and n
′ > n. For
the optimal income tax problem itself, this possibility is eliminated by upward incentive
compatibility.
11See Roëll (1985), Brunner (1993, 1995), and Homburg (2004).




cuyy are everywhere strictly negative.








for all n ∈ N and all v in the range of u( , ,n). Under these assumptions on
the functions u,c∗, and y∗, condition DR also holds if N is a ﬁnite set and
the diﬀerences between neighbouring elements of N are uniformly small.
Proposition 2.2 reduces the desirability of redistribution to three sub-
stantive properties of the utility function: First, u is concave. Second, the
marginal disutility of producing additional output is decreasing in n. Third,
for any n′ ∈ N, the function v → un(c∗(n′,v),y∗(n′,v),n′) is diﬀerentiable,
and its slope is negative. Thus, in Figure 1, un is strictly decreasing as one
is moving up along the locus A − A of eﬃcient outcome pairs for type n′.
The ﬁrst two properties are familiar from the literature. Concavity of u
reﬂects inequality aversion or neutrality. Positivity of uyn reﬂects the idea
that a person with higher productivity has a lower marginal disutility of
producing additional output than a person with lower productivity. For the
simple utility speciﬁcation (2.1) with concave U, this idea combines the two
notions that (i) the person with higher n needs less labour to produce the
given output y and therefore has a lower marginal disutility of labour, and
(ii) the person with higher n needs a smaller labour increment to obtain a
given output increment.
To understand the third property, observe that the locus of eﬃcient out-
come pairs coincides with the locus of solutions to the problem of maximizing
u(c,y,n′) under the budget constraint c = α + y. Let v∗, given by
v∗(α,n′) := max
y≥0
u(α + y,y,n′), (2.17)
be the associated indirect utility function. Under the given assumptions, v∗
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with v∗







Condition (2.16) is therefore equivalent to the requirement that v∗
nα(α,n′) <
0 for all n′ and α. This requirement in turn is equivalent to the requirement
that v∗
αn(α,n′) < 0 for all n′ and α, i.e., that, in the absence of distortionary
taxation, the "social marginal utility of income" is a decreasing function of
n.
13This latter condition is again well known. It ﬁgures prominently in the
literature on optimal utilitarian linear income taxation, see e.g., Hellwig
(1986). However, there it is used globally, to assess the welfare implications
of raising the marginal income tax everywhere above zero. Here, the con-
dition vαn < 0 is used locally to establish part (b) of consition DR, i.e.,
to show that, for any n ∈ N and any n′ > n suﬃciently close to n, the
inequality (2.13) is satisﬁed if the assignment of (c,y) to n and of (c′,y′)
to n′ is compatible with consumption monotonicity and downward incentive
compatibility and, moreover, (c,y) is eﬃcient for n and (c′,y′) is eﬃcient or
distorted downwards from eﬃciency for n′.
For utility functions taking the form (2.1), the inequality v∗
αn < 0 and
therefore (2.16) is implied by strict concavity of u and noninferiority of
leisure.13 For arbitrary utility functions, (2.16) holds if consumption is nor-
mal,14 if leisure is noninferior, and if uyn > 0 and ucn < 0.
Regardless of the signs of
∂y∗
∂v and ∂c∗
∂v , i.e., regardless of the ordinal
properties of u, condition DR is always satisﬁed if u is suﬃciently concave.
To see this, suppose that u = ϕ◦ˆ u, where ˆ u satisﬁes RMQ, PEP, and SSCC,
and ϕ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
Then u and ˆ u have the same ordinal properties. Moreover, conditions (2.15)
and (2.16) take the form
ϕ′ˆ uyy + ϕ′′ˆ u2
y ≤ 0 (2.18)











+ ϕ′′ˆ un < 0. (2.20)
From these conditions, one immediately obtains:
Corollary 2.3 Assume that ˆ u satisﬁes RMQ, PEP, and SSCC, and suppose
that the eﬃcient-outcome function (c∗( , ),y∗( , )) is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable. Let ϕ be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly
concave. If N is an interval, the function u = ϕ ◦ ˆ u satisﬁes condition DR
if the curvature −
ϕ′′
ϕ′ of the function ϕ is everywhere suﬃciently large.
13See Christiansen (1983) or Werning (2000). For utility functions taking the form





















14Under RMQ and SSCC, (2.16) is also satisﬁed if consumption is nonnormal and uyn >
0.
14Corollary 2.3 highlights the importance of the cardinal properties of u
for the desirability of redistribution. Whereas, e.g., Seade (1982) used strict
concavity, a cardinal property, and noninferiority of leisure, an ordinal prop-
erty, to derive the desirability of redistribution, Corollary 2.3 shows that,
whatever the ordinal properties of u may be, (local) redistribution of leisure
is always desirable if u( , ,n) is suﬃciently concave.
This being said, one should also see that, for reasons related to the ordi-
nal properties of u, condition DR can be satisﬁed even if u is not concave.
This is the case, e.g., for the linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas speciﬁca-
tion




This speciﬁcation satisﬁes DR. However, the desire for redistributing leisure
is driven by the consideration that the disutility of producing additional
output is lower for people with higher n, rather than by inequality aversion.
This observation indicates that, in model with heterogeneous productivity
levels, redistributive utilitarian intervention is motivated not only by in-
equality aversion, but also by the consideration that the total burden of
producing a given aggregate output is smaller if output requirements are
aligned with productivity parameters.
3 The Main Theorems
Throughout the paper, conditions RMC, PEP, SSCC, and DR will be taken
for granted without any further mention. Under these assumptions, one can
prove the following results.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that the support N of the distribution F is ﬁnite or
that N is an interval [n0,n1] and F has a density f, which is continuous
and strictly positive on N. Let (c( ),y( )) be any canonical solution to the
weakly relaxed income tax problem, and let v( ) be the associated indirect
utility function. Then (c( ),y( )) and v( ) satisfy the following:
a: There is no distortion at the top, i.e.,
(c(n1),y(n1)) = (c∗(n1,v(n1)),y∗(n1,v(n1))). (3.1)
b: Between the bottom and the top of N, i.e., for n ∈ (n0,n1), the pair
(c(n),y(n)) is distorted downward from eﬃciency and satisﬁes
(c(n),y(n)) << (c∗(n,v(n)),y∗(n,v(n))); (3.2)
15indeed, on any compact subset of (n0,n1), (c(n),y(n)) is bounded away from
eﬃciency.
c: At the bottom, i.e., for n = n0, consumption-output pairs are also dis-
torted downward from eﬃciency if the N is a ﬁnite set or if the monotonicity
constraint on c( ) is strictly binding at n0. If F has a density on N = [n0,n1]
and if c( ) is strictly increasing at n = n0, 15 there is no distortion at the
bottom, i.e.,
(c(n0),y(n0)) = (c∗(n0,v(n0)),y∗(n0,v(n0))). (3.3)
d: The functions c( ) and y( ) are co-monotonic on N, i.e., for any n and
n′ > n in N, y(n′) > y(n) if c(n′) > c(n), and y(n′) = y(n) if c(n′) = c(n).
Moreover, the allocation (c( ),y( )) is incentive compatible.
e: The function y( )−c( ) is co-monotonic with c( ) and y( ). Moreover,
there exists ¯ n ∈ (n0,n1) such that y(n) < c(n) for n ∈ [n0, ¯ n) and y(n) >
c(n) for n ∈ (¯ n,n1]; in particular, c(n0) > y(n0) ≥ 0.
Theorem 3.2 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the weakly relaxed
income tax problem and the optimal income tax problem have the same
canonical solutions. In particular, any canonical solution (c( ),y( )) to the
optimal income tax problem satisﬁes statements (a) - (e) of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, any tax schedule T
that is associated with a canonical solution to the weakly relaxed and the
optimal income tax problem is strictly increasing on the range y(N) of the
output provision function. If T is diﬀerentiable from the right,16 the right-
hand derivative τ( ) satisﬁes
lim
n↑n1
τ(y(n)) = 0, (3.4)
as well as
τ(y(n)) ∈ (0,1) (3.5)
15A nondecreasing function g(.) is said to be strictly increasing at n if, for every ε > 0,
one has g(n+ ε) > g(n) or g(n) > g(n− ε).
16If N is an interval and the allocation (c( ),y( )) is continuous, the tax schedule T( ) is
necessarily diﬀerentiable on y(N); its derivative τ( ) is then given by (3.10) holding with
equality. However, if N is a ﬁnite set or if the allocation (c( ),y( )) is not continuous, the
set y(N) is not an interval. In this case, the speciﬁcation of T(y) for y / ∈ y(N) is somewhat
arbitrary; this arbitrariness introduces the possibility that, at a boundary point of y(N),
the speciﬁed tax schedule may not be diﬀerentiable from the right. However, it is always
possible to specify T( ) so that the right-hand derivative τ(y) exists for all y and satisﬁes
(3.10) for all n ∈ N.
16for all n ∈ (n0,n1); indeed, on any compact subset of (n0,n1), τ(y(n)) is
bounded away from zero and one. If F has a density on N = [n0,n1] and if
c( ) is strictly increasing at n = n0,
lim
n↓n0 τ(y(n)) = 0; (3.6)
if N is ﬁnite or if the monotonicity constraint on c( ) is strictly binding at
n0, then
lim
n↓n0 τ(y(n)) > 0. (3.7)
Theorem 3.1 characterizes the solutions to the weakly relaxed income
tax problem. Theorem 3.2 establishes the equivalence of the weakly relaxed
income tax problem with the optimal income tax problem. Theorem 3.3 for-
mulates the implications of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 for optimal tax schedules,
showing that the optimal marginal income tax is zero at the top and strictly
positive between the top and the bottom; indeed, on any compact subset
of (n0,n1), the optimal marginal tax is bounded away from zero. At y(n0),
the optimal marginal income tax is positive if the fraction of the population
producing the output y(n0) is positive (because n0 has positive mass or be-
cause there is bunching). The optimal marginal income tax at y(n0) is zero
if F(n0) = 0, and there is no bunching at y(n0).
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 follow in a straightforward manner from Theorem
3.1. Without going into details, I brieﬂy sketch the arguments. For Theorem
3.2, one notes that the constraint set for the optimal income tax problem is
a subset of the constraint set for the weakly relaxed income tax problem. By
Statement (d) of Theorem 3.1, any solution to the weakly relaxed income
tax problem is incentive compatible and therefore lies in the constraint set
for the optimal income tax problem. Such a solution must therefore also be a
solution to the optimal income tax problem. Moreover, because all solutions
to the optimal income tax problem generate the same welfare level, any other
solution to the optimal income tax problem generates the same welfare level
as a solution to the weakly relaxed income tax problem and must itself be
a solution to the latter problem. Given Theorem 3.1, these considerations
establish Theorem 3.2.
As for Theorem 3.3, a tax schedule that implements the allocation (c( ),y( ))
must satisfy
T(y(n)) := y(n) − c(n) (3.8)
17for all n ∈ N.17 Incentive compatibility requires that, for all n ∈ N, y(n)
maximizes u(y − T(y),y,n). If T( ) has a right-hand derivative τ(y(n)) at
y(n), the ﬁrst-order condition for this maximization is
uc(c(n),y(n),n)(1 − τ(y(n)))+ uy(c(n),y(n),n) ≤ 0. (3.9)





so τ(y(n)) is zero, positive, or negative as (c(n),y(n)) is eﬃcient, distorted
downward, or distorted upward from eﬃciency. Equations (3.4) - (3.7) thus
follow from statements (a) - (c) of Theorem 3.1. As for the ﬁrst statement of
Theorem 3.3, this follows directly from (3.8) and statement (e) of Theorem
3.1.
The argument for Theorem 3.1 is less straightforward. It involves the
following major steps. First, if consumption is constant on some set of types,
then output requirements must also be constant on this set. If they were
not constant, then, by downward incentive compatibility, they would have
to be decreasing in n. However, by RMQ and part (a) of DR, it would
then be possible to raise welfare by equalizing output requirements for the
productivity parameters in question. The change could be executed without
aﬀecting adjacent downward incentive compatibility.
Second, because upward incentive constraints play no role, outcome pairs
cannot be distorted upward from eﬃciency. If, for type n, they were dis-
torted upward, then it would be possible to reduce this type’s consumption
c(n) and output provision y(n) in such a way that the diﬀerence c(n)−y(n)
is reduced even though the utility v(n) = u(c(n),y(n),n) is unchanged. By
SSCC, such a reduction would not aﬀect downward incentive compatibility.
The decrease in c(n) − y(n) could be used to make, e.g., types near the
top better oﬀ without aﬀecting downward incentive compatibility. Thus,
the initial allocation could not have been a solution to the weakly relaxed
income tax problem.
Third, at any n between the bottom and the top, either consumption
monotonicity or downward incentive compatibility is strictly binding.18 If
17If there is bunching, with y(n) = ¯ y for several types n, incentive compatibility dictates
that c
A(n) = ¯ c for the same types, so (3.8) is still unambigous.
18In the sense that the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipliers or Pontryagin costate
variables are nonzero. This is stronger than merely having one of the constraints hold as
an equation.
18neither constraint were strictly binding, the consumption-output pair as-
signed to type n would be eﬃcient. Because, by the previous argument, the
consumption-output pairs for higher types are eﬃcient or distorted down-
ward from eﬃciency, part (b) of condition DR would imply that the sum of
utilities could be increased by redistributing output requirements from type
n to some slightly higher types, making type n better oﬀ and the higher types
worse oﬀ, without aﬀecting adjacent downward incentive compatibility.
Fourth, at any n′ ∈ (n0,n1), some downward incentive compatibility con-
straint holds as an equation. For suppose that downward incentive compat-
ibility is not binding at n′. Then, by the preceding argument, consumption
monotonicity is strictly binding, i.e., c( ) must be constant in a neighbour-
hood of n′. By the ﬁrst step, y( ) is also constant on this interval. Therefore,
for n′ and n belonging to this interval, the downward incentive compatibility
condition (2.6) holds as an equation, i.e., downward incentive compatibility
is weakly binding.
Fifth, the functions c( ) and y( ) are co-monotonic, and the allocation
is incentive compatible. Given that downward incentive compatibility is
everywhere weakly binding, an increase in c( ) must always be accompanied
by an increase in y( ) and vice versa. In particular, therefore, the allocation is
nondecreasing. Incentive compatibility then follows from the single-crossing
condition.
Sixth, c(n) > 0 for all n ∈ N; in particular, c(n0) > 0. Because downward
incentive compatibility is everywhere weakly binding, the indiﬀerence curve
of any type n ∈ N in the point (c(n),y(n)) must be tangent to the image
set of the function (c( ),y( )) to the left of this point. In the absence of
upward distortions from eﬃciency, the slope dc
dy of this indiﬀerence curve
at (c(n),y(n)) is no greater than one. Therefore, c( ) cannot be steeper at
n than y( ), i.e., the diﬀerence c( ) − y( ) must be nonincreasing. Because
c( ) − y( ) is nonincreasing, one has c(n) − y(n) ≤ c(n0) − y(n0) for all
n ∈ N. It follows that c(n0) > 0 and, by monotonicity, c(n) > 0 for all
n ∈ N. Otherwise, by PEP, all types would be worse oﬀ than they are under
laissez-faire.
Finally, given that consumption is strictly positive, the same argument
as in the third step can be used to show that, for n ∈ (n0,n1), the pair
(c(n),y(n)) must be distorted downward from eﬃciency. If (c(n),y(n)) were
eﬃcient, then, with c(n) > 0 and, by PEP, y(n) > 0, the pair (c(n),y(n))
would have to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition
uc(c(n),y(n),n) + uy(c(n),y(n),n) = 0. (3.11)
19If (3.11) holds, a small reduction in type n’s consumption and output pro-
vision by the same amount would leave the feasibility constraint (2.2) unaf-
fected. This reduction would have no ﬁrst-order eﬀects on the utility of type
n. However, it would have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the utility u(c(n),y(n),n′)
that type n′ > n could obtain by imitating type n. Therefore, it would make
room for some redistribution of output requirements from type n to type
n′. By part (b) of DR, the overall eﬀect of these changes would be to raise
the sum of utilities, contrary to the presumed optimality of the given al-
location. Given that (c(n),y(n)) is distorted downward from eﬃciency for
n ∈ (n0,n1), the argument in the preceding step can be strengthened to
the eﬀect that c(n) − y(n) is decreasing at any n at which c( ) and y( ) are
increasing.
4 The Case of Finitely Many Types
In this section, I prove Theorem 3.1 for the case when the support N of
the type distribution F is ﬁnite. Without loss of generality, I set N =
{n1,n2,...,nm}, where n0 = n1 < ... < nm = n1. I also write fi := F({ni}) >
0. An allocation (c( ),y( )) is identiﬁed with a sequence {(ci,yi)}m
i=1 such
that (ci,yi) = (c(ni),y(ni)) for i = 1,...,m.
I will not actually study the weakly relaxed income tax problem as such.








subject to the feasibility condition
m ￿
i=1
(yi − ci) ≥ 0, (4.2)
and the requirement that the adjacent downward incentive constraint
u(ci,yi,ni) ≥ u(ci−1,yi−1,ni), (4.3)
and the monotonicity condition
ci ≥ ci−1 (4.4)
be satisﬁed for i = 2,...,m. In this formulation, the downward incentive
constraints (2.6) have been replaced by the adjacent downward incentive
20constraints (4.3). I will show that the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold for
any solution to this maximization problem. By the same argument as in
the proof of Theorem 3.2, it follows that the solutions to the weakly relaxed
income tax problem coincide with the solutions to the problem of maximizing
(4.1) subject to (4.2) - (4.4) and that these solutions satisfy statements (a)
- (e) of Theorem 3.1.
The Lagrangian for problem (4.1) can be written as
m ￿
i=1
u(ci,yi,ni) fi + λ
m ￿
i=1




 i[u(ci,yi,ni) − u(ci−1,yi−1,ni)] +
m ￿
i=2
νi(ci − ci−1), (4.5)
where λ and  i, νi, i = 2,...m, are nonnegative multipliers for the constraints
(2.2), (2.6), and (2.7). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution are:
uc(ci,yi,ni)(fi +  i) − λfi −  i+1uc(ci,yi,ni+1)+ νi − νi+1 ≤ 0 (4.6)
for ci, i = 1,...,m, with a strict inequality only if ci = 0, and
uy(ci,yi,ni)(fi +  i)+ λfi −  i+1uy(ci,yi,ni+1) ≤ 0 (4.7)




(yi − ci)fi = 0, (4.8)
 i[u(ci,yi,ni) − u(ci−1,yi−1,ni)] = 0 (4.9)
and
νi(ci − ci−1) = 0 (4.10)
for i = 2,...,m. In the remainder of this section, the allocation {(ci,yi)}m
i=1
is taken to be a solution to problem (4.1); λ,  i, and νi, i = 2,...m, are the
associated Kuhn-Tucker multipliers.
If the monotonicity constraint on consumption is binding, then people
with the same consumption must also provide the same output. If they
didn’t, then, by downward incentive compatibility, the "higher" type would
be providing less output. Then part (a) of DR would imply that a redistri-
bution of output requirements from the "lower" type to the "higher" type
would raise welfare. This is formally shown as:
19If i = m, (4.6) and (4.7) hold with  i+1 = νi+1 = 0.
21Lemma 4.1 For any k, ck = ck−1 implies yk = yk−1.
Proof. Suppose that the lemma is false, and let k be such that ck = ck−1
and yk  = yk−1. Then downward incentive compatibility implies yk < yk−1,
hence
u(ck,yk,nk) > u(ck−1,yk−1,nk). (4.11)
By (4.9), it follows that  k = 0. Therefore (4.7) becomes:
uy(ck−1,yk−1,nk−1)(fk−1 +  k−1) + λfk−1 = 0 (4.12)
for i = k − 1 and
uy(ck,yk,nk)fk + λfk −  k+1uy(ck,yk,nj) ≤ 0 (4.13)
for i = k. From (4.12) and (4.13), one obtains
uy(ck−1,yk−1,nk−1) ≥ −λ ≥ uy(ck,yk,nk), (4.14)
contrary to part (a) of DR. The assumption that ck = ck+1 and yk  = yk+1
for some k has thus led to a contradiction and must be false.
The next lemma shows that, for a solution to problem (4.1), distortions
from eﬃciency all go in the same direction. Consumption and output provi-
sion are never distorted upward from eﬃciency. To abbreviate the notation,
I write (c∗
k,y∗
k) for the pair (c∗(nk,v(nk)),y∗(nk,v(nk))) that provides type
nk with the utility v(nk) = u(ck,yk,nk) at the lowest net resource require-
ment.
Lemma 4.2 For any k, (ck,yk) ≤ (c∗
k,y∗
k).
Proof. If the lemma is false, one has ck > c∗
k or yk > y∗
k for some k. Let
ˆ k be the largest index k for which this is the case. Further, let I(ˆ k) be the
set of indices i with the same consumption as index ˆ k, and let ˆ ı := minI(ˆ k).
Lemma 4.1 implies (ck,yk) = (cˆ k,yˆ k) for all k ∈ I(ˆ k). By RMQ and the fact
that
u(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k) = v(nˆ k) = u(c∗
ˆ k,y∗
ˆ k,nˆ k),
one must actually have cˆ k > c∗
ˆ k and yˆ k > y∗
ˆ k. It follows that cˆ k and yˆ k
are both strictly positive, so for k ∈ I(ˆ k), the ﬁrst-order conditions (4.6)
and (4.7) hold as equations. Upon summing these equations from ˆ ı to
22ˆ k, cancelling out all terms that refer to adjacent downward incentive and
monotonicity constraints for indices between ˆ ı and ˆ k, one obtains
ˆ k ￿
i=ˆ ı





[uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni)fi+λfi]+ ˆ ıuy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ ı)− ˆ k+1uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) = 0. (4.16)
Upon adding (4.15) and (4.16) and rearranging terms, noting that, by the
deﬁnition of ˆ ı and (4.10), νˆ ı must be equal to zero, one further obtains
ˆ k ￿
i=ˆ ı
[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni)]fi +  ˆ ı[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ ı) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ ı)]
=  ˆ k+1[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1)] + νˆ k+1. (4.17)
Because cˆ k > 0 and yˆ k > 0, (cˆ k,yˆ k) >> (c∗
ˆ k,y∗
ˆ k) implies uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k) +
uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k) < 0. By SSCC, it follows that
uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni)+ uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni) < 0 (4.18)
for all i < ˆ k. Therefore the left-hand side of (4.17) is strictly negative.
Because  ˆ k+1 and νˆ k+1 are both nonnegative, it follows that (4.17) implies
 ˆ k+1 > 0 and
uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) < 0. (4.19)
Now  ˆ k+1 > 0 implies ˆ k < m and, by (4.9),
u(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1) = u(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1). (4.20)
Because u is quasiconcave and cˆ k+1 ≥ cˆ k, (4.19) and (4.20) imply that
uc(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) < 0, hence
(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1) >> (c∗
ˆ k+1,y∗
ˆ k+1),
contrary to the deﬁnition of ˆ k as the largest index for which the assertion
of the lemma is false. The assumption that ck > c∗
k or yk > y∗
k for some k
has thus led to a contradiction and must be false.
23The following lemma shows that, for any k below the top, either the
downward incentive compatibility constraint or the consumption monotonic-
ity constraint of type k+1 must be strictly binding. Part (b) of DR is crucial
for this result.
Lemma 4.3 For any k < m, at least one of the multipliers  k+1,νk+1 is
nonzero.
Proof. If the lemma is false, then, for some ˆ k < m, one has  ˆ k+1 =
νˆ k+1 = 0. For i = ˆ k, the ﬁrst-order conditions (4.6) and (4.7) become
uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)(fˆ k +  ˆ k)− λfˆ k + νˆ k ≤ 0, (4.21)
with equality unless cˆ k = 0, and
uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)(fˆ k +  ˆ k) + λfˆ k ≤ 0, (4.22)
with equality unless yˆ k = 0. Upon adding these equations, one obtains
[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)+ uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)](fˆ k +  ˆ k)+ νˆ k ≤ 0, (4.23)
with equality unless cˆ k = 0 or yˆ k = 0. By RMQ and the nonnegativity of
νˆ k, it follows that (cˆ k,yˆ k) ≥ (c∗
ˆ k,y∗




By PEP, it follows that yˆ k > 0. Therefore, (4.22) holds as an equation.
This yields:
uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k) ≥ −λ. (4.24)
Further, because  ˆ k+1 = 0 and  ˆ k+2uy(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+2) ≤ 0, the ﬁrst-order
condition (4.7) for i = ˆ k + 1 yields
uy(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1) ≤ −λ. (4.25)
Upon combining (4.24) and (4.25), one obtains
￿ ￿ ￿uy(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1)
￿ ￿ ￿ ≥
￿ ￿uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)
￿ ￿. (4.26)
However, because uy(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1) ≥ uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1), cˆ k+1 ≥ cˆ k,
and, by Lemma 4.2, (cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1) ≤ (c∗
ˆ k+1,y∗
ˆ k+1), for i = ˆ k + 1, part (b)
of condition DR implies
￿ ￿
￿uy(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1)
￿ ￿
￿ <
￿ ￿uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)
￿ ￿. (4.27)
24The assumption that  ˆ k+1 = νˆ k+1 = 0 for some ˆ k < m has thus led to a
contradiction and must be false.
On the basis of Lemma 4.3, one easily ﬁnds that adjacent downward
incentive constraints are everywhere binding.20
Lemma 4.4 For any k < m,
v(nk+1) = u(ck,yk,nk+1), (4.28)
Proof. If the lemma is false, there exists ˆ k < m, such that
v(nˆ k+1) > u(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1). (4.29)
(The reverse inequality is ruled out by downward incentive compatibility.)
Because v(nˆ k+1) = u(cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1,nˆ k+1), one also has (cˆ k+1,yˆ k+1)  = (cˆ k,yˆ k).
By Lemma 4.1 and monotonicity, therefore, cˆ k+1 > cˆ k. Then (4.9) and (4.10)
yield  ˆ k+1 = 0 and νˆ k+1 = 0. By Lemma 4.3., this is impossible.
Lemma 4.5 The sequences {ci}m
i=1 and {yi}m
i=1 are co-monotonic, i.e., for
any k < m, yk ≤ yk+1,with equality if and only if ck = ck+1. Moreover, the
allocation {(ci,yi)}m
i=1 is incentive compatible.
Proof. Under RMQ, the ﬁrst statement follows trivially from (4.28) and
the inequality ck+1 ≥ ck. Because (ck,yk) ≤ (ck+1,yk+1), (4.28) and SSCC
imply
v(nk) ≥ u(ck+1,yk+1,nk). (4.30)
The allocation {(ci,yi)}m
i=1 thus satisﬁes adjacent upward as well as adjacent
downward incentive compatibility. Given the monotonicity of the allocation
and SSCC, overall incentive compatibility follows by standard arguments.
Relying on Lemmas 4.4 and 4.2, the next two lemmas show that the
diﬀerence ck −yk is nondecreasing in k and that consumption is everywhere
strictly positive. The argument for Lemma 4.6 is familiar from Guesnerie
and Seade (1982).
20Without taking recourse to Lemma 4.3, (4.28) could also be established by the geo-
metric argument of Guesnerie and Seade (1982), see also Homburg (2004). However, for
Lemma 4.9 below, one needs Lemma 4.3 anyway.
25Lemma 4.6 For any k < m,
ck+1 − yk+1 ≤ ck − yk; (4.31)
moreover, the inequality in (4.31) is strict unless ck+1 = ck.
Proof. For any k < m, Lemma 4.4 implies that, for type nk+1, the
point (ck,yk) lies on the indiﬀerence curve through (ck+1,yk+1). By Lemma
4.2 in combination with the strict quasiconcavity of u, the slope of this
indiﬀerence curve at any point (c,y) below (ck+1,yk+1) is less than one.
The lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 4.7 For all k, ck > 0.
Proof. If the lemma is false, there is a nonempty set I0 of indices k such
that ck = 0 for k ∈ I0. I claim that, in this case, the allocation {(ci,yi)}m
i=1




for any i, yLF
i = argmaxu(y,y,ni).
By (2.7), I0 takes the form {1,...,ˆ k}, where ˆ k < m. By RMQ and PEP,
one has
u(0,yk,nk) ≤ u(0,0,nk) < u(yLF
k ,yLF
k ,nk) (4.32)
for all k ∈ I0. For k > ˆ k, Lemma 4.6 implies ck−yk ≤ cˆ k+1−yˆ k+1 and, since




for k / ∈ I0, as well as for k ∈ I0. However, dominance of the laissez-faire
allocation contradicts the assumption that {(ci,yi)}m
i=1 is a solution to the
weakly relaxed income tax problem. The assumption that ck = 0 for some
k must therefore be false.
Relying on the positivity of consumption, the next lemma shows that,
at the top, there is no distortion and the allocation is strictly increasing.
Lemma 4.8 (cm,ym) = (c∗
m,y∗
m) and (cm−1,ym−1) << (cm,ym).
Proof. By Lemma 4.7, cm > 0. In combination with the feasibility con-
straint (2.2), Lemma 4.7 also implies yk > 0 for some k. By the monotonic-
ity of output provision that was established in Lemma 4.4, it follows that
ym > 0. For i = m, therefore, (4.6) and (4.7) hold as equations. Upon
26adding these equations and noting that  m+1 = νm+1 = 0 and νm ≥ 0, one
obtains
(uc(cm,ym,nm)+ uy(cm,ym,nm))(fm +  m) ≤ 0, (4.34)
hence (cm,ym) ≥ (c∗
m,y∗
m). By Lemma 4.2, itfollows that (cm,ym) = (c∗
m,y∗
m).
By SSCC, (4.34) implies uc(cm,ym,nm−1) + uy(cm,ym,nm−1) < 0. By
Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4, it follows that (cm−1,ym−1) << (cm,ym).
To conclude the argument, I ﬁnally show that, below the top, consump-
tion and output provision must be distorted downward from eﬃciency. The
argument again relies on Lemma 4.3 and, thereby, on part (b) of condition
DR.
Lemma 4.9 For any k < m, (ck,yk) << (c∗
k,y∗
k).
Proof. Suppose that the lemma is false. Then, for some k < m, one has
ck > 0 and ck ≥ c∗
k or yk ≥ y∗
k. Let ˆ k be the largest index for which this is the
case. By Lemma 4.2, cˆ k ≥ c∗
ˆ k or yˆ k ≥ y∗
ˆ k is only possible if (cˆ k,yˆ k) = (c∗
ˆ k,y∗
ˆ k).
By PEP, it follows that yˆ k > 0. For i = ˆ k, therefore, (4.7) as well as (4.6)
must hold as equations. Upon adding these equations, one obtains
[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)+ uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k)](fˆ k +  ˆ k)+ νˆ k
=  ˆ k+1[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1)] + νˆ k+1. (4.35)
With cˆ k > 0 and yˆ k > 0, eﬃciency of the pair (cˆ k,yˆ k) implies
uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k) = 0, (4.36)
so (4.35) yields
νˆ k =  ˆ k+1[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1)] + νˆ k+1. (4.37)
I claim that the left-hand side of (4.37) is zero. For suppose not and let
νˆ k > 0. By (4.10) and Lemma 4.1, one then has cˆ k−1 = cˆ k and yˆ k−1 = yˆ k.
At the same time, (4.36) and SSCC imply
uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,ni) < 0,
so Lemma 4.2 implies (cˆ k−1,yˆ k−1)  = (cˆ k,yˆ k) for i < ˆ k. The assumption that
νˆ k > 0 thus leads to a contradiction and must be false.
Thus, (4.37) implies
 ˆ k+1[uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1)] + νˆ k+1 = 0. (4.38)
27However, by SSCC, (4.36) also implies uc(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) + uy(cˆ k,yˆ k,nˆ k+1) >
0. Because  ˆ k+1 and νˆ k+1 are nonnegative, it follows that (4.38) implies
 ˆ k+1 = νˆ k+1 = 0. By Lemma 4.3, this is impossible.
The preceding arguments show that the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold
for any solution to problem (4.1): Statement (a) follows from Lemma 4.8,
statements (b) and (c) from Lemma 4.9, statement (d) from Lemma 4.5,
and statement (e) from Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7.
Given that the constraint set for the weakly relaxed income tax problem
is a subset of the constraint set for problem (4.1) and, by Lemma 4.5, any
solution to the latter problem is incentive compatible, any such solution
must also be a solution to the weakly relaxed income tax problem. Moreover,
because all solutions to the weakly relaxed income tax problem generate the
same welfare level, any other solution to this problem generates the same
welfare level as a solution to problem (4.1) and must itself be a solution to
the latter problem. The validity of Theorem 3.1 for the case of ﬁnitely many
types follows immediately.
5 The Case of a Continuum of Types
5.1 The Optimal Control Problem
The optimal-control problem is formulated in terms of the indirect utility
function v( ). If F has a continuous density f on N = [n0,n1], the welfare






(y(n) − c(n))f(n)dn ≤ 0. (5.2)
By well known arguments,21 in the model with a continuum of types
satisfying SSCC, the incentive compatibility condition (2.3) is equivalent to





for all n ∈ N and that y( ) be nondecreasing on N. The following lemma,
provides an analogous characterization of downward incentive compatibility.
21See, e.g., Mirrlees (1976).
28Lemma 5.1 An allocation (c( ),y( )) with nondecreasing c( ) is downward
incentive compatible if and only if the indirect utility function v( ) that is
given by (2.5) satisﬁes




for some nondecreasing function S( ).
The proof of Lemma 5.1 is given in the Appendix. The function S( )
can be interpreted as a measure of cumulative slack in downward incentive
compatibility conditions. A comparison of (5.4) with (5.5) indicates that
a downward incentive compatible and nondecreasing allocation is incentive
compatible if and only if this slack function takes the constant value v(n0).
The weakly relaxed problem is thus equivalent to the problem of choosing
v( ),c( ),y( ),S( ) so as to maximize (5.1), subject to (2.5), (5.2), (5.4), and
weak monotonicity of c( ) and S( ). If the functions c( ) and S( ) were known
to be absolutely continuous, this problem would be actually be a standard
problem of optimal control: In this case, one could treat v( ),c( ), and S( )
as state variables and the slopes q( ) := c′( ) and r( ) := S′( ), as well as
the output requirement y( ), as control variables. The downward incentive
compatibility condition could be rewritten as
v′(n) = r(n) + un(c(n),y(n),n), (5.5)
and the slopes q(n) = c′(n) and r(n) = S′(n) would have to be nonnegative.
The Hamiltonian for this control problem would be
H(n) = v(n)f(n) + λ(y − c(n))f(n) + χ(n)(u(c(n),y,n) − v(n))
+ϕ(n)[r(n)+ un(c(n),y,n)] + ψ(n)q(n), (5.6)
where λ and χ(n) are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (5.2) and
(2.5); ϕ( ) and ψ( ) are the costate variables associated with the state vari-
ables v( ) and c( ).
Maximization of the Hamiltonian with respect to the controls requires
that for almost every every n ∈ N,
λf(n)+ χ(n)uy(c(n),y(n),n) + ϕ(n)uny(c(n),y(n),n) ≤ 0, (5.7)
with equality if y(n) > 0; further,
ϕ(n) ≤ 0, (5.8)
29with equality if r(n) > 0, and
ψ(n) ≤ 0, (5.9)
with equality if q(n) > 0. The costate variables ϕ( ) and ψ( ) must be ab-
solutely continuous, with derivatives satisfying
ϕ′(n) = −f(n) + χ(n) (5.10)
and
ψ′(n) ≤ λf(n)− χ(n)uc(c(n),y(n),n) − ϕ(n)unc(c(n),y(n),n) (5.11)
for almost all n ∈ N; (5.11) holds with equality if c(n) > 0. In addition, ϕ( )
and ψ( ) must satisfy the transversality conditions
ϕ(n0) = ϕ(n1) = 0, (5.12)
and
ψ(n0)c(n0) = ψ(n1) = 0. (5.13)




(y(n) − c(n))f(n)dn = 0. (5.14)
The argument that I have just sketched, with c( ) and S( ) assumed to be
absolutely continuous, corresponds to the approach of Guesnerie and Laﬀont
(1984) or Ebert (1992). In fact, there is no reason to presume that c( ) and
S( ) are continuous, let alone absolutely continuous. However, the analysis
in Hellwig (2005a) shows that absolute continuity of c( ) and S( ) is not
actually needed. Monotonicity itself provides enough structure to permit
the formulation of a maximum principle for the given control problem.
The resulting necessary conditions are identical to the ones just given,
with one modiﬁcation: (5.8) must hold as an equation if S( ) is strictly
increasing at n, and (5.9) must hold as an equation if c( ) is strictly increasing
at n; these requirements extend the maximum principle for the "slopes" of
c( ) and S( ) from the case where these slopes are well deﬁned to the case
where these "slopes" may be inﬁnite, e.g., because the functions c( ) and
S( ) are discontinuous. Even in this case, the values of the "slopes" that are
being chosen must maximize the products of these "slopes" with the costate
variables of c( ) and S( ); i.e., if c( ) or S( ) is strictly increasing at n, the
corresponding costate variable must be zero.
30If one uses (5.10) to eliminate χ(n) from (5.11) and (5.7), one obtains:
ψ′(n) − λf(n) + ucf(n) + ϕ′(n)uc + ϕ(n)unc ≤ 0, (5.15)
with equality if c(n) > 0, and
λf(n)+ uyf(n)+ ϕ′(n)uy + ϕ(n)uny ≤ 0, (5.16)
with equality if y(n) > 0. Except for the fact that ψ′(n) appears in the
condition for c(n) rather than y(n), these conditions are familiar from Ebert
(1992) and Brunner (1993). If ψ′(n) = 0, they reduce to the corresponding
conditions in Mirrlees (1971, 1976) and Seade (1977, 1982).









with equality if c(n) > 0 and y(n) > 0. This is the central condition of the
model with a continuous type distribution. If c(n) > 0 and y(n) > 0 and








which lies at the core of the analysis of Mirrlees and Seade. Because uy < 0,
the left-hand side is negative or positive, depending on whether uc + uy is
positive or negative, i.e., on whether (c(n),y(n)) is distorted downward or
upward from eﬃciency. The Single-Crossing Condition implies that unc −
uc
uyuny is positive, so the sign of the right-hand side is the same as the sign
of ϕ(n).
Whereas, at this point, Seade (1982) proceeds to investigate the sign of
ϕ(n) by considering the global properties of ϕ when treated as a solution
to (5.15) and (5.16), the indirect approach developed here has ϕ(n) ≤ 0
already from the necessary condition (5.8) for the choice of the slack function
S( ). For any n at which (5.18) holds, one immediately knows that uc +
uy is nonnegative, i.e., that (c(n),y(n)) cannot be distorted upward from
eﬃciency.
Moreover, for any n, ϕ(n) = 0 implies that ϕ reaches a maximum at n. If
ϕ were known to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, then for n ∈ (n0,n1),
ϕ(n) = 0 would imply that ϕ′(n) = 0 and ϕ′′(n) ≤ 0. From (5.18) and from
(5.16) holding as an equation, one would therefore obtain uc + uy = 0 and
λ+uy = 0. Moreover, for (5.16) holding as an equation, total diﬀerentiation
31would yield d
dnuy = −ϕ′′(n)uy ≤ 0. Because this is incompatible with con-
dition DR, it seems that, for n ∈ (n0,n1), one cannot have ϕ(n) = 0. This
implies ϕ(n) < 0 and hence, by (5.18), uc + uy > 0 so that (c(n),y(n)) is
distorted downward from eﬃciency.
Unfortunately, matters are not so simple: One cannot presume that ϕ is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, not even that ϕ′ is continuous. Moreover,
one must consider the role of ψ′(n) in (5.15) and (5.17) and the possibility
that (5.15) - (5.17) are inequalities rather than equations. The formal proof,
which is given in the next subsection, addresses these issues.
The proof will follow the same line of argument as the proof for the case
of ﬁnitely many types. To understand the parallel, it is useful to note that
the Hamiltonian (5.6) has the same structure as the sum of terms with index
i in the Lagrangian (4.5) for the ﬁnite-type problem, except that (5.6) has
ϕ(n) and ψ(n) where (4.5) has − i and −νi. The optimality conditions here
have also the same structure as the ﬁrst-order conditions (4.6) - (4.10). For
instance, if one rewrites (4.6) in the form
νi − νi+1 − λfi + uc(ci,yi,ni)fi − [ i+1uc(ci,yi,ni+1) −  iuc(ci,yi,ni)] ≤ 0,
one sees that, with − i and −νi taking the place of ϕ(n) and ψ(n), this has
the same structure as (5.15). Once the parallel is seen, the line of argument
to be followed is clear from the ﬁnite-type case.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1 for a Continuum of Types
Throughout this subsection, (c( ),y( )) is a canonical solution to the weakly
relaxed income tax problem, v( ) is the associated payoﬀ function, and λ ≥ 0,
χ( ), ϕ( ),ψ( ) are the associated Lagrange multipliers and costate variables.
The ﬁrst step of the proof shows that people with the same consumption
must also provide the same output. This corresponds to Lemma 4.1 in the
ﬁnite-type case. Part (a) of condition DR again plays a central role.
Lemma 5.2 For any n and n′ > n, in N, c(n) = c(n′) implies that y( ) is
constant on (n,n′).
Proof. Suppose that the lemma is false, and let n, n′ > n be such
that that c(n) = c(n′), and y( ) is not constant on (n,n′). Because c( ) is
constant on [n,n′], downward incentive compatibility implies that y( ) is
nonincreasing on [n,n′]. Therefore, if y( ) is not constant on (n,n′), there
32exists a point ˆ n ∈ (n,n′) at which y( ) is strictly decreasing. Then one has
v(nk) − v(nj) =
￿ nk
nj
uy(c(˘ n),y(˘ n), ˘ n)dy(˘ n) +
￿ nk
nj




un(c(˘ n),y(˘ n), ˘ n)d˘ n,
for all nj ∈ (n, ˆ n) and all nk ∈ (ˆ n,n′). The slack function S( ) is therefore
strictly increasing at ˆ n. Because (5.8) must hold as an equation if S( ) is







then (5.8) implies hy(n) ≤ 0 for all n, and ϕ(ˆ n) = 0 implies hy(ˆ n) = 0,
so the function hy( ) has a maximum at ˆ n. For some sequence {nj} which
converges to ˆ n from below, one therefore has h′





for all j. Moreover, for some sequence {nk} which converges to ˆ n from above,
one has h′





for all k. Because y( ) is strictly decreasing at ˆ n, one must have y(nj) > 0
for all j. For n = nj, therefore, (5.16) must hold as an equation. Upon





for all j. In contrast, for n = nk, (5.16) holds as inequality. Upon combining
this inequality with (5.21), taking account of the fact that uy(c(nk),y(nk),nk) <





for all k. (5.22) and (5.23)imply that uy(c(nj),y(nj),nj) ≥ uy(c(nk),y(nk),nk)
for all j and k.
33However, for any suﬃciently large j and k, one also has c(nj) = c(nk)
and y(nj) > y(nk). For such j and k, RMC implies uy(c(nk),y(nk),nj) >
uy(c(nk),y(nk),nk), contrary to part (a) of DR. The assumption that, for
some n, n′ > n, and ˆ n ∈ (n,n′), one has c(n) = c(n′) and y( ) strictly
decreasing at ˆ n has thus led to a contradiction and must be false.
Lemma 5.3 The Lagrange multiplier of the feasibility constraint is strictly
positive, i.e. λ > 0.
In the ﬁnite-type case, the assertion of Lemma 5.3 is trivial because any
slack in the feasibility constraint can be used to raise the highest type’s
consumption without upsetting downward incentive compatibility or con-
sumption monotonicity. In the continuous-type case, the conclusion is still
true, but one has to pay more attention to the constraints. The argument,
which is given in the Appendix, is purely technical and provides no addi-
tional insight.
The next lemma shows that consumption and output provision are (al-
most) never ineﬃciently high. This corresponds to Lemma 4.2 in the ﬁnite-
type case. A minor complication is caused by the possibility that v( ) or c( )
might be discontinuous. Relying on the monotonicity of v( ) and c( ), I there-
fore introduce the left-hand limits ˆ v(n) = limn′↑n v(n′),ˆ c(n) = limn′↑n c(n′).
By RMQ, one can also deﬁne ˆ y(n) so that ˆ v(n) = u(ˆ c(n), ˆ y(n),n), and one
has ˆ y(n) = limn′↑n y(n′). Further, using abbreviated notation again, I write
(c∗(n),y∗(n)) and (ˆ c∗(n), ˆ y∗(n))for the eﬃcient pairs (c∗(n,v(n)),y∗(n,v(n)))
and (c∗(n,ˆ v(n)),y∗(n, ˆ v(n))) corresponding to the utility levels v(n) and
ˆ v(n).
Lemma 5.4 For all n ∈ N, (ˆ c(n), ˆ y(n)) ≤ (ˆ c∗(n), ˆ y∗(n)). In particular,
(c(n),y(n)) ≤ (c∗(n),y∗(n)) for all n ∈ N at which (c( ),y( )) is continuous.
Proof. If the lemma is false, one has (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)) >> (ˆ c∗(ˆ n), ˆ y∗(ˆ n)) for
some ˆ n ∈ N. Because ˆ v(ˆ n) = limn↑ˆ n v(n), RMC implies that
(ˆ c∗(ˆ n), ˆ y∗(ˆ n)) = lim
n↑ˆ n
(c∗(n),y∗(n)).
By the deﬁnition of (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)), it follows that, for some δ > 0, one has
(c(n),y(n)) >> (c∗(n),y∗(n)) for all n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n). It follows that c(n) > 0
34and y(n) > 0 for all n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n). On the interval (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n), (5.17) must








By RMQ, the inequality (c(n),y(n)) >> (c∗(n),y∗(n)), and Lemma 5.3, the
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (5.24) is strictly positive. By SSCC
and (5.8), the second term on the right-hand side of (5.24) is nonnegative.
Therefore, ψ′(n) > 0 for n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n). Since (5.9) implies ψ(ˆ n) ≤ 0, it
follows that ψ(n) < 0 for all n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n).
By the transversality condition ψ(n0) = 0, the set {n < ˆ n−δ|ψ(n) = 0}
is nonempty. Let ¯ n be the supremum of this set. By the continuity of ψ, one
has ψ(¯ n) = 0 and ¯ n < ˆ n − δ. By the deﬁnition of ¯ n, one also has ψ(n) < 0
for all n ∈ (¯ n, ˆ n). Therefore, c(n) = c(ˆ n) for all n ∈ (¯ n, ˆ n). By Lemma 5.2,
it follows that y(n) = y(ˆ n) for all n ∈ (¯ n, ˆ n + δ). However, by SSCC, the
inequality
uc(c(ˆ n),y(ˆ n), ˆ n)+ uy(c(ˆ n),y(ˆ n), ˆ n) < 0
implies that
uc(c(ˆ n),y(ˆ n),n)+ uy(c(ˆ n),y(ˆ n),n) < 0 (5.25)
for all n < ˆ n. By (5.24), it follows that ψ′(n) > 0 for n ∈ (¯ n, ˆ n − δ), as well
as n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n). Since ψ(ˆ n − δ) < 0, it follows that ψ(¯ n) < 0, contrary to
the deﬁnition of ¯ n. The assumption that (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)) >> (ˆ c∗(ˆ n), ˆ y∗(ˆ n)) for
some ˆ n ∈ N thus leads to a contradiction and must be false.
The next lemma shows that, at any n ∈ (n0,n1), either the monotonicity
constraint on S( ) or the monotonicity constraint on consumption must be
strictly binding. This corresponds to Lemma 4.3 in the ﬁnite-type case.
Again, part (b) of condition DR is central to the argument.
Lemma 5.5 For any n ∈ (n0,n1), at least one of the costate variables ϕ(n),
ψ(n) is nonzero.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 follows the same line of argument as the proof
of Lemma 4.3, namely:
Step 1: If ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0 for some ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1), then (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)) =
(ˆ c∗(n), ˆ y∗(n)), i.e., the left-hand limit limn↑ˆ n(c(n),y(n)) is eﬃcient for ˆ n.
Step 2: If ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0for some ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1), then |uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n)| ≤
λ.
35Step 3: If ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0 for some ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1), then there exists a se-





λ for all k.
Step 4: The conclusions of Steps 1 - 3 are in conﬂict with part (b) of
condition DR.
However, in the continuous-type case, the argument for each of these
steps is signiﬁcantly more involved than in the ﬁnite-type case. The ﬁrst
three steps are therefore given as separate lemmas.
Lemma 5.6 For any ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1], ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0 implies
(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)) = (ˆ c∗(n), ˆ y∗(n)). (5.26)
Moreover, if ˆ c(ˆ n) > 0, then c(n) < ˆ c(ˆ n) for n < ˆ n.
Proof. ψ(ˆ n) = 0 implies that, for some sequence {nk} which converges
















By the continuity of ϕ, ϕ(ˆ n) = 0 implies that the left-hand side of (5.27)
goes to zero as nk converges to ˆ n. Since uk






and hence, by RMQ, that
uc(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) + uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) ≤ 0. (5.28)
Thus (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)) ≥ (ˆ c∗(ˆ n), ˆ y∗(ˆ n)). By Lemma 5.4 and RMQ, one also has
(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)) ≤ (ˆ c∗(ˆ n), ˆ y∗(ˆ n)). (5.26) follows immediately.
By PEP, it follows that ˆ y∗(ˆ n) > 0. If ˆ c(ˆ n) > 0, the ﬁrst-order condition
for (ˆ c∗(ˆ n), ˆ y∗(ˆ n)) implies that
uc(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) + uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) = 0. (5.29)
For n < ˆ n therefore, SSCC implies
uc(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n),n) + uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n),n) < 0,
so Lemma 5.4 yields (c(n),y(n))  = (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n)). By Lemma 5.2, it follows
that c(n)  = ˆ c(ˆ n). By consumption monotonicity, therefore, c(n) < ˆ c(ˆ n) for
n < ˆ n.
36Lemma 5.7 For any ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1), ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0 implies
|uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n)| ≤ λ. (5.30)
Proof. Let ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1) be such that ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0. I distinguish two
cases according to whether ˆ c(ˆ n) is zero or positive. In either case, Lemma
5.6 yields (5.26), so PEP implies ˆ y(ˆ n) > 0.
If ˆ c(ˆ n) = 0, then, by the monotonicity of consumption and Lemma 5.2,
one must have c(n) = 0 and y(n) = ˆ y(ˆ n) for n < ˆ n. Positivity of ˆ y(ˆ n) implies
that, for n ∈ (n0, ˆ n), (5.16) must hold as an equation. With c(n) = 0 and
y(n) = ˆ y(ˆ n), this equation takes the form
λf(n)+ uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n),n)f(n) +
d
dn
ϕ(n)uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n),n) = 0. (5.31)
Now RMC and (5.8) imply that ϕ(n)uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n),n) ≥ 0 for all n. Because
ϕ(ˆ n)uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) = 0, it follows that, for some sequence {nj} which con-
verges to ˆ n from below, one has d
dn[ϕ( )uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n), )](nj) ≤ 0 for all j, hence
λf(nj) + uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n),nj)f(nj) ≥ 0 for all j. Upon taking limits as nj con-
verges to ˆ n, one ﬁnds that |uy(0, ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n)| ≤ λ, which is just (5.30).
If ˆ c(ˆ n) > 0, then, by Lemma 5.6, one has ˆ c(ˆ n) > c(n) for all n < ˆ n.
Therefore there exists a sequence {nk} converging to ˆ n from below such
that ψ(nk) = 0 for all k. Because ˆ c(ˆ n) > 0, one may also suppose that, for














































































for all k. Lemma A.4 in the Appendix shows that the right-hand side of










dn ≥ 0 (5.35)
37for all k. (5.35) holding, regardless of k, implies that, for some sequence
{nj} converging to ˆ n from below, one has λ ≥ uc(c(nj),y(nj),nj) for all j.
By RMQ, it follows that λ ≥ uc(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n). To establish (5.30), it now
suﬃces to observe that, with ˆ c(ˆ n) > 0 and ˆ y(ˆ n) > 0 (5.26) implies
uc(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) + uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) = 0.
Lemma 5.8 For any ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1), ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0 implies that, for some
sequence {nk} which converges to ˆ n from above, one has
￿ ￿ ￿uy(c(nk),y(nk),nk)
￿ ￿ ￿ ≥ λ (5.36)
for all k.
Proof. Let ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1) be such that ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0. As in the proof






, so (5.8) implies hy(n) ≤ 0
for all n, and ϕ(ˆ n) = 0 implies hy(ˆ n) = 0. Because hy( ) has a maximum at
ˆ n, there exists a sequence {nk} which converges to ˆ n from above, such that
h′









for all k. Given that uy(c(nk),y(nk),nk) < 0, (5.36) follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. By downward incentive compatibility, Lemma
5.6, and Lemma 5.4, the triples (ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n) and (c(nk),y(nk),nk) satisfy





￿ < |uy(ˆ c(ˆ n), ˆ y(ˆ n), ˆ n)|. However, this is incompatible
with (5.30) and (5.36).
Given Lemma 5.5, the following lemma shows that downward incentive
compatibility is everywhere locally binding. This is the analogue of Lemma
4.4 in the ﬁnite-type case.
38Lemma 5.9 For any n ∈ (n0,n1),
dv
dn
(n) = un(c(n),y(n),n). (5.37)
Proof. If the lemma is false, then, by (5.4), there exists a point ˆ n ∈
(n0,n1) at which the slack function S( ) is strictly increasing. By the comple-
mentary slackness condition associated with (5.8), it follows that ϕ(ˆ n) = 0.
By Lemma 5.5, it follows that ψ(ˆ n) < 0. Because ψ is continuous, one must
have ψ(n) < 0 for all n in some neighbourhood [ˆ n − δ, ˆ n + δ] of ˆ n. By
the complementary slackness condition associated with (5.9), it follows that
(c(n),y(n)) = (c(ˆ n),y(ˆ n)) for all n ∈ [ˆ n − δ, ˆ n + δ]. Hence





By (5.4), it follows that S(ˆ n+δ)−S(ˆ n−δ) = 0, contrary to the assumption
that S( ) is increasing at ˆ n. The assumption that S( ) is increasing at ˆ n must
therefore be false.
From (5.37), RMQ, and SSCC, in combination with the continuity of
the allocation at n0 and n1, one immediately obtains:
Corollary 5.10 The functions c( ) and y( ) are co-monotonic, i.e., y( ) is
increasing at any point at which c( ) is increasing and constant on any set
on which c( ) is constant. Moreover, the allocation (c( ),y( )) is incentive
compatible.
Relying on Lemmas 5.4 and 5.9, the following two lemmas replicate
Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, showing that the diﬀerence between consumption and
required output is nondecreasing and that consumption must be positive.
Lemma 5.11 The function n → c(n)−y(n) is nonincreasing on N; on any
subset of N on which (c(n),y(n)) is distorted downward from eﬃciency, the
function n → c(n)− y(n) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. For any ˆ n ∈ [n0,n1) and any n ∈ (ˆ n,n1], one can write
















Because Lemma 5.4 implies that uc(c(n′),y(n′),n′) ≥ −uy(c(n′),y(n′),n′) for
almost all n′, with a strict inequality if (c(n′),y(n′)) is distorted downward
from eﬃciency, the result follows.
Lemma 5.12 For n ∈ N, consumption is bounded away from zero.
Proof. If the lemma is false, one has c(n0) = 0. By Lemma 5.11, one
then has
c(n) − y(n) ≤ −y(n0) ≤ 0 (5.40)
for all n ∈ N. But then, for all n ∈ N, one has
u(c(n),y(n),n) ≤ u(yLF(n),yLF(n),n), (5.41)




The allocation (c( ),y( )) would thus be dominated by the laissez-faire allo-
cation (yLF( ),yLF( )) and could not be a canonical solution to the weakly
relaxed income tax problem unless one had (c(n),y(n)) = (yLF(n),yLF(n))
for almost all n ∈ N. Given that c(n0) = 0, it follows that yLF(n0) = 0. By
PEP, this is impossible.
Lemma 5.13 On any compact subset of (n0,n1), (c(n),y(n)) is distorted
downward and bounded away from eﬃciency.
Proof. If the lemma is false, there exists a sequence {nj} converging to






By Lemma 5.9, the function v( ) is continuous at ˆ n. Therefore,
lim
k→∞
(c∗(nj),y∗(nj)) = (c∗(ˆ n),y∗(ˆ n)). (5.43)
40By (5.43) and Lemma 5.12, one has c∗(ˆ n) > 0 and, by PEP, y∗(ˆ n) > 0.
Therefore,
uc(c∗(ˆ n),y∗(ˆ n), ˆ n) + uy(c∗(ˆ n),y∗(ˆ n), ˆ n) = 0. (5.44)
I claim that ψ(ˆ n) = 0. If ψ(ˆ n) < 0, then, by the continuity of ψ, there
exists δ > 0 such that ψ(n) < 0 for all n ∈ (ˆ n−δ, ˆ n+δ). Then c(n) = c∗(ˆ n)
and, by Lemma 5.2, y(n) = y∗(ˆ n) for all n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n + δ). By SSCC and
(5.44), it follows that (c(ˆ n),y(ˆ n)) >> (c∗(ˆ n),y∗(ˆ n)) for all n ∈ (ˆ n − δ, ˆ n),
contrary to Lemma 5.4. The assumption that ψ(ˆ n) < 0 thus leads to a
contradiction and must be false.
Since ψ(ˆ n) = 0 and, by (5.9), ψ(n) ≤ 0 for n > ˆ n, there exists a sequence
{nk} which converges to ˆ n from above such that ψ′(nk) ≤ 0 for all k. By
the monotonicity of the allocation, one has
(c(nk),y(nk)) ≥ lim
j→∞
(c(nj),y(nj)) >> (0,0) (5.45)















ny) ≤ 0 (5.46)
where the derivatives uk
c,uk
y, etc. are all evaluated at (c(nk),y(nk),nk). By
Lemma 5.4, one also has (c(nk),y(nk)) ≤ (c∗(nk),y∗(nk)). Upon combining
this inequality with (5.45), (5.42), and (5.43), one sees that
lim
k→∞
(c(nk),y(nk)) = (c∗(ˆ n),y∗(ˆ n)).









f(nk) = 0. (5.47)




uny) ≤ 0. (5.48)
By SSCC, (unc − uc
uyuny) is strictly positive, so (5.48) implies ϕ(ˆ n) ≥ 0. By
(5.8), it follows that ϕ(ˆ n) = 0.
However, the ﬁnding that ϕ(ˆ n) = ψ(ˆ n) = 0 contradicts Lemma 5.5. The
assumption that (5.42) holds for some sequence {nj} converging to some
ˆ n ∈ (n0,n1) must therefore be false.
41To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 for the continuum case, I consider
the behaviour of the allocation near the top and the bottom. Given the
canonicity assumption that (c(n1),y(n1)) = (ˆ c(n1), ˆ y(n1)), Lemma 5.6 and
the transversality conditions (5.12)and (5.13) immediately yield (c(n1),y(n1)) =
(c∗(n1),y∗(n1)), as well as c(n1) > c(n1) for n < n1. At the bottom, matters
are slightly more complicated.
Lemma 5.14 If c( ) and y( ) are strictly increasing at n0, then
(c(n0),y(n0)) = (c∗(n0,v(n0)),y∗(n0,v(n0))); (5.49)
if the monotonicity constraint on c( ) is strictly binding at n0, then
(c(n0),y(n0)) << (c∗(n0,v(n0)),y∗(n0,v(n0))). (5.50)
Proof. Let {nk} be any sequence which converges to n0 from above.
















for all k. Because ϕ and f, as well as the allocation (c( ),y( )) are continuous
at n0, it follows that ψ′(nk) converges to a limit ψ′(n0). By the transversality






ny) on the right-hand side of (5.51)





If c( ) and y( ) are strictly increasing at n0, the sequence {nk} can be chosen
in such a way that ψ′(nk) ≥ 0 for all k. Given that ψ(n0) = 0 and ψ(nk) ≤ 0
for all k, it follows that ψ′(n0) = 0, so (5.52) implies (5.49). In contrast, if
ψ′(n0) < 0, (5.52) implies (5.50).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 for the continuous-type case is now complete.
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 follow from Theorem 3.1 by the argument given in
the text.
42A Appendix: Supplementary Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The proof of Proposition 2.2 proceeds in several steps. Each step corresponds
to a diﬀerent subset of the set of pairs (c′,y′) for which the inequality (2.13)
is deemed to hold. For a better understanding of the structure, it will be
useful to refer back to Figure 1.
The ﬁrst step concerns those outcome pairs (c′,y′) that lie on the hor-
izontal line from the pair which is assigned to type n to the vertical axis.
The following claim shows that, for such outcome pairs, the inequality (2.13)
holds regardless of whether the pair which is assigned to type n is eﬃcient
or not. This claim follows directly from the concavity of u and (2.15).
Claim A.1 If (c,y,n) ∈ ℜ2
+×[n0,n1) and (c′,y′,n′) ∈ ℜ2
+×(n,n1] are such
that c′ = c and y′ ≤ y, then |uy(c′,y′,n′)| < |uy(c,y,n)|.
The second step concerns outcome pairs (c′,y′) that lie on the indiﬀerence
curve I(n′)of type n′ between the reference point (c∗(n),y∗(n))and the point
(c∗(n′),y∗(n′)) that is eﬃcient for n′.
Claim A.2 For any (c,y,n) ∈ ℜ2
+ ×[n0,n1) such that (c,y) is eﬃcient for
n, there exists ε > 0 such that |uy(c′,y′,n′)| < |uy(c,y,n)| for any n′ ∈
(n,n + ε] and any (c′,y′) that satisﬁes
u(c′,y′,n′) = u(c,y,n′), (A.1)
as well as c ≤ c′ ≤ c∗(n′,u(c,y,n′)).
Proof. If c = 0 or y = 0 and if the ﬁrst-order condition for (c,y) to be
eﬃcient for n,
uc(c,y,n) + uy(c,y,n) ≤ 0, (A.2)
holds as a strict inequality, then, for n′ suﬃciently close to n, (c,y) must
also be eﬃcient for n′. In this case, (A.1) and c ≤ c′ ≤ c∗(n′,u(c,y,n′))
imply (c′,y′) = (c,y), hence




and the claim follows from (2.15).
Alternatively, if (c,y) satisﬁes the equation
uc(c,y,n) + uy(c,y,n) = 0, (A.3)
43then, for n′ > n, SSCC implies
uc(c,y,n′)+ uy(c,y,n′) > 0
By PEP, there exists a unique pair (c∗(n′,u(c,y,n′)),y∗(n′,u(c,y,n′))) that
lies on I(n′) and is eﬃcient for n′. This pair is strictly greater than (c,y) and
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition for an interior eﬃcient point, uc + uy = 0.
By RMQ, the indiﬀerence curve I(n′) is strictly convex. Between the
reference point (c,y) and the eﬃcient pair for n′, its slope is strictly de-
creasing from
uc(c,y,n′)
|uy(c,y,n′)| to one. For any point (c′,y′) on I(n′) that satisﬁes







+ (1 − δ). (A.4)
Conversely, for the given n′ and any δ ∈ [0,1], there exists a pair (ˆ c(n′,δ), ˆ y(n′,δ))
such that (c′,y′) = (ˆ c(n′,δ), ˆ y(n′,δ)) lies between (c,y) and (c∗(n′),y∗(n′))
and is the unique solution to equations (A.1) and (A.4). By construction,
one has (ˆ c(n,δ), ˆ y(n,δ)) = (c,y) for all δ. One also has (ˆ c(n′,0), ˆ y(n′,0)) =
(c∗(n′,u(c,y,n′)),y∗(n′,u(c,y,n′))) for all n′.
By standard arguments, relying on the implicit function theorem, the
assumption that indiﬀerence curves have positive Gaussian curvature implies
that the functions ˆ c( , ) and ˆ y( , ) that are deﬁned by (A.1) and (A.4) are
continuously diﬀerentiable. It follows that, for any δ ∈ [0,1] and any n′ ≥ n,
the derivative














∂n′(n,δ) = −(1 − δ)
(ucn + uyn)
ucc + ucy + uyc + uyy
. (A.6)
22Positivity of the Gaussian curvature implies that the denominator in (A.6) is strictly
negative.
44For any δ ∈ [0,1], one therefore obtains




ucc + ucy + uyc + uyy
(uyc + uyy) + uyn




ucc + ucy + uyc + uyy
ucn +
(ucc + ucy)





























The right-hand side of (A.7) is independent of δ. By (2.15) and (2.16), it is
also strictly positive. It follows that, for some ε > 0, n′ ∈ (n,n + ε] implies
duy(ˆ c(n′,δ), ˆ y(n′,δ),n′)
dn′ (n′,δ) > 0
for all δ ∈ [0,1]. The claim follows immediately.
The third step concerns those outcome pairs (c′,y′) for type n′ that lie in
the shaded area to the left of the curve A−A of eﬃcient points in Figure 1
and strictly above the indiﬀerence curve I(n′), as well as the horizontal line
through the reference point (c∗(n),y∗(n)). The argument is adapted from
Brunner (1995).
Claim A.3 Suppose that (c,y) is eﬃcient for n, and let ε be given by
Claim 2. Then |uy(c′,y′,n′)| < |uy(c,y,n)| for any n′ ∈ (n,n + ε] and
any (c′,y′) such that c′ > c, u(c′,y′,n′) > u(c,y,n′), and uc(c′,y′,n′) +
uy(c′,y′,n′) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let q be such that
quc(c′,y′,n′) + uy(c′,y′,n′) = 0. (A.8)
Because uy(c′,y′,n′) < 0 and uc(c′,y′,n′) + uy(c′,y′,n′) ≥ 0, one must have
q ∈ (0,1]. For any v in the range of u, let (¯ c(v), ¯ y(v)) be the solution to the
problem of minimizing c′′ − qy′′ under the constraint that u(c′′,y′′,n′) ≥ v.
The existence of such a solution follows from RMQ, PEP and the fact that
45q ≤ 1. By RMQ, the solution satisﬁes (¯ c(v), ¯ y(v)) ≤ (c∗(n′,v),y∗(n′,v)) for
all v.
From (A.8), one easily ﬁnds that (c′,y′) = (¯ c(u(c′,y′,n′)), ¯ y(u(c′,y′,n′))).
Because u is concave, one also has
￿







whenever v < u(c′,y′,n′). In particular,




If ¯ c(u(c,y,n′)) ≥ c, the claim follows from (A.9) because Claim A.2 yields
|uy(¯ c(u(c,y,n′)), ¯ y(u(c,y,n′)),n′)| < |uy(c,y,n)|. If ¯ c(u(c,y,n′)) < c, then,
by the intermediate value theorem, there exists ˆ v ∈ (u(c,y,n′),u(c′,y′,n′))
such that ¯ c(ˆ v) = c and ¯ y(v) < y. For this ˆ v, Claim A.1 yields |uy(¯ c(ˆ v), ¯ y(ˆ v),n′)| <
|uy(c,y,n)|, so again, the claim follows from (A.9).
To complete the proof of Proposition 2.2, it suﬃces to note that, if N is
an interval, then there is no loss of generality in postulating that n + ε is
an element of N. The same is true if N is a ﬁnite set and the elements of N
are suﬃciently close.
A.2 Additional Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. The argument follows Mirrlees (1976). For any n,
let S(n) be the diﬀerence between v(n) and the integral
￿ n
n0 un(c(n′),y(n′),n′)dn′.
If S( ) is a nondecreasing function, one has
￿ n
n′
χ(n′′,n)dS(n) ≥ 0 (A.10)
for all n, all n′ < n, and every nonnegative-valued function χ. By the deﬁn-
ition of S( ), (A.10) is equivalent to the inequality
￿ n
n′
χ(n′′,n)[uc(c(n′′),y(n′′),n′′)dc(n′′) + uy(c(n′′),y(n′′),n′′)dy(n′′)] ≥ 0.
With χ(n′′,n) =
uy(c(n′′),y(n′′),n)









uc(c(n′′),y(n′′),n′′)dc(n′′) ≥ 0 (A.11)
46for all n and all n′ < n.
























uy(c(n′′),y(n′′),n)dy(n′′) ≥ 0, (A.13)
hence
u(c(n),y(n),n) ≥ u(c(n′),y(n′),n) (A.14)
for all n and all n′ < n. Monotonicity of c( ) and S( ) is thus suﬃcient for
downward incentive compatibility.
Conversely, for all n and all n′ < n, downward incentive compatibility
implies















for every increasing sequence {nk}K
k=1 with n1 = n′ and nK = n. Upon
taking limits across sequences {nk}K
k=1 as K goes out of bounds and the
sequence {nk}K
k=1 becomes dense in the interval [n′,n], one concludes that




and, hence, that S(n) ≥ S(n′) for all n and all n′ < n.
47Lemma A.4 For any ˆ n and ¯ n ∈ [n0,n1] such that ψ(ˆ n) = 0 and ψ(¯ n) ≤ 0,









dn ≥ 0; (A.17)
(A.17) holds with equality if and only if ψ(¯ n) = 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let ¯ n < ˆ n. Neglecting null sets, one
may suppose that ψ′(n) is nonzero only on intervals of constancy of c( ). On
such intervals, by Lemma 5.2, y( ) is also constant. Let I be the collection
of such intervals between ¯ n and ˆ n and note that I is at most countable.
For any I ∈ I, let n0(I) and n1(I) be the inﬁmum and the supremum of
I, and let c(I),y(I) be the common value of (c(n′),y(n′)) on (n0(I),n1(I)).





























































































[ψ(n1(I)) − ψ(n0(I))]. (A.19)
If ψ(¯ n) = 0, then, by the deﬁnition of n0(I) and n1(I) and the continuity of










dn = 0 (A.20)
48for all I ∈ I. Given that the set I is at most countable, (A.18) and (A.20)










If ψ(¯ n) < 0, there exists an initial interval I1 of constancy of c( ) such that
¯ n = n0(I1). For I ∈ I\{I1}, one again has ψ(n0(I)) = ψ(n1(I)) = 0, so





























[ψ(n1(I1)) − ψ(¯ n)].
By the deﬁnition of n1(I1) and the continuity of ψ, one has ψ(n1(I1)) = 0.































































dn < 0. (A.23)











The assumption that λ = 0 has thus led to a contradiction and must be
false.
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